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I. INTRODUCTION
Progress has its costs. As our society continues to expand in size
and complexity, we create benefits while generating new and difficult
problems. Nowhere is this more evident than in the siting of facilities.
Airports, prisons, power plants, landfills, and shopping centers are things
that most everyone would agree are necessary and desirable for the
efficient operation of a modem society.' Yet ask who is willing to have
such a facility in his or her community and the reflex response will
assuredly be, "No, not here." This "Not in My Backyard" (NIMBY)
response has become "the rule rather than the exception"2 for the
developers and planners attempting to construct unpopular facilities.
The NIMBY reaction is, of course, understandable. A facility, if
effectively and efficiently operated, will benefit society as a whole, yet the
cost of these benefits will be disproportionately borne by the host
community.3 Thus, the targeted community reacts with costly litigation
and public pressure with the hope of making it economically infeasible to
proceed with the proposed project.
These dynamics clearly hold true in the case of siting hazardous
waste facilities. The consequences of these battles are quite severe in light
of the estimated one trillion pounds of hazardous waste that are produced
yearly in the United States.4  The Wisconsin Legislature explicitly
recognized this reality when it drafted its facility siting statute.5 The
legislature found that "the creation of solid and hazardous waste is an
unavoidable result of the needs and demands of modem society ... [and]
disposal of hazardous waste is necessary to preserve the economic strength
of [the] state and to fulfill the diverse needs of its citizens."' While most
recognize that hazardous waste is a necessary evil that should be dealt with
in a responsible and safe manner, few are willing to stand idle while their
communities are slated for new sites.7
1. See MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBUC OPPOSITION 1 (1983).
2. Id. at 6.
3. Ivan Fong, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Through Negotiation, 6 STAN. ENVTL.
LJ. 161, 163 (1986-87).
4. Andrea Shalal-Esa, Ohio Incinerator Fight Highlights U.S. Waste Problems, REUTER
ASIA-PACIFIC Bus. REP., Feb. 8, 1993 available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
5. See WiS. STAT. § 144.445 (1989-1990).
6. Id. § 144.445(1)(a) & (d).
7. See O'HARE Ct al., supra note 1, at 7.
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A. East Liverpool, Ohio
The NIMBY phenomenon has surfaced in East Liverpool, Ohio
where Waste Technologies Industries (WTI) recently began operating one
of the largest hazardous waste incinerators in the country.' When fully
operational, the 165 million dollar incinerator is expected to bum 60,000
tons of hazardous waste per year.' The facility has been the source of
enormous controversy ever since its proposed development in 1981."
The controversy and opposition, however, are not limited to East
Liverpool but rather extend to neighboring West Virginia and Pennsylvania
where residents and officials are concerned about the potential health risks
associated with being down-wind from the plant." Over the course of
the last twelve years, the East Liverpool facility has been the subject of
constant litigation and public opposition, resulting both in great delay and
in huge expenditures of financial resources.' The fight to condemn the
plant's operation progressed all the way to the White House. During the
course of the 1992 Presidential campaign, then Vice Presidential candidate
Al Gore said that the Clinton Administration would seek to halt operations
until such time as Congress could investigate both the plant's safety and
the process by which the plant obtained its state and federal operating
8. See Keith Schneider, 2 Admit E.P.A. Violated Hazardous Waste Law in Issuing
Permit, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at A15.
9. See Keith Schneider, Gore Says Clinton Will Try to Halt Waste Incinerator, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992, at D9. The plant is authorized to bum over 300 toxins including
chemical warfare agents, pesticides, and herbicides. T.C. Brown, Fisher Mum on Waste
Probe Details; EPA Given Finished 200 Page Report on $165 Million Burner, THE PLAIN
DEALER, June 19, 1993, at 5B.
10. Much of the controversy stems from the fact that the facility is situated about 400
yards from an elementary school and about 100 yards from residential housing. See Colman
McCarthy, Gore Loses His 'Balance', WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at CIO. Six months
after WTI received the necessary construction and operating permits, Ohio established new
rules that prevent siting hazardous waste facilities in such close proximity to schools or
residential areas. See Schneider, supra note 8, at A15.
11. See Staggers Calls on EPA to Deny WI Spray Dryer Authorization, PR NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. It is interesting to note
that while the WTI incinerator controversy rages, cement kilns burn more hazardous waste as
a fuel source than most commercial incinerators. This practice was left virtually unregulated
until 1991, and even now the enforcement of those regulations has been questionable. See
Betsy Carpenter & David Bowermaster, The Cement Makers' Long, Sweet Ride, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., July 19, 1993, at 51.
12. In late 1992, officials of WTI testified that delays in the plant's operation were
costing the company $115,000 per day in fixed costs and were jeopardizing several long-term
contracts with customers. See Paul Kemezis, Ohio Incinerator Given the Go-ahead,
CHEMICAL WK., Nov. 25, 1992, at 14.
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permits.Y Like many promises made in the course of a political
campaign, this pledge appears to have become buried in an ambitious
political agenda." The promise itself, nevertheless, demonstrates the
scope and intensity of the dispute.
B. A Possible Solution?
In an attempt to deal with the inherent problems associated with
siting hazardous waste facilities, several states have incorporated
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques into their siting statutes.
Through the use of negotiation and arbitration, these statutes strive to have
the host community and the developer work together to produce a binding
agreement that will outline the obligations of each party.' Proponents of
ADR believe these techniques will help ensure that all parties to the
dispute will be able to participate meaningfully1) ' in the siting process and
ultimately ensure that the facility will not endanger public health and
safety.17
This Comment will explore the possibility of incorporating ADR
provisions into Ohio's hazardous waste siting statute, using the East
Liverpool incinerator as a case comparison. This examination will begin
by outlining Ohio's statutory provisions for siting hazardous waste
facilities and detailing some of the major disputes that have arisen in
connection with the siting of the East Liverpool incinerator. This
Comment will then explore the efforts of two states, Massachusetts and
Wisconsin, to use ADR provisions to alleviate public opposition to
proposed hazardous waste facilities. This examination, in conjunction with
the problems experienced in East Liverpool, will reveal some potential
13. See Schneider, supra note 9, at D9.
14. Many opponents of the incinerator feel betrayed by what they perceive as the
Clinton Administration's failure to aggressively intervene in East Liverpool as promised
during the campaign. On December 7, 1993, several opponents protested this inaction in
front of the White House and were subsequently arrested on felony charges after handcuffing
themselves to a dump truck. See Kimberly C. Moore, Ohio Protestors Demonstrate Against
Gore's 'Hypocrisy,' STATES NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
15. Note, The Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Controversy: The Massachusetts
Experience, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 138 (1986).
16. Susan Caskey, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Siting Hazardous Waste
Facilities: The Pennsylvania Proposal in Light of the Wisconsin and Massachusetts Statutes,
5 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 58, 59 (1986).
17. Phillip M. Cronin, Environmental Law-Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility-Ability
of City or Town to Prevent Siting, 70 MASS. L. REV. 40 (1985).
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benefits, as well as limitations, of any attempt to incorporate ADR into
Ohio's hazardous waste siting statute.
II. HAzARDous WASTE SarING UNDER OHIO LAW
Under Ohio law, one wishing to establish a hazardous waste
treatment facility must begin by giving notice of the general design and
purpose of the facility to the legislative authority of each municipal
corporation, township, and county in which the site may be located.'
Following this notice, the applicant must submit an application for a
hazardous waste facility installation and operation permit to the state
Director of the Environmental Protection Agency.' If the application
appears to comply with agency rules and meets applicable performance
standards, the director will forward the application to the Hazardous Waste
Facility Board (Board)."
The Board, whose membership includes the state Director of the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of the Department of
Natural Resources, the Chairman of the Ohio Water Development
Authority, one chemical engineer, and one geologist, is responsible for
scheduling and conducting a public hearing on the application At this
hearing, any person may "submit written or oral comments or objections
to the approval or disapproval of the application.'" The Board will then
conduct an adjudication hearing to decide all disputed issues between the
parties respecting the approval or disapproval of the application.3 The
parties to this adjudication hearing include the applicant, the staff of the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Board of County Commissioners,
the Board of Township Trustees, the chief executive officer of the
municipal corporation in which the facility is proposed to be located, and
any other person who would be aggrieved or adversely affected by the
18. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05(C) (Baldwin 1992).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 3734.05(D)(3).
21. Id. § 3734.05(D)(1).
22. Id. § 3734.05(D)(3)(a). This hearing is non-adversarial. Instead, it is a forum in
which those affected by the proposed facility can gain information and express concerns. See
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3734-1-02(G) (1986).
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05(D)(6) (Baldwin 1992). In contrast to the public
hearing, the adjudication hearing is adversarial in nature and resembles traditional litigation,
complete with pre-trial conferences, discovery, rules of evidence, and witnesses. See
generally OHIO ADMN. CODE §§ 3734-1-27 to -1-52 (1986).
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING
proposed facility.' The Board then evaluates the application and
ultimately gives its approval or disapproval based on criteria including the
facility's environmental impact, its effect on public health and safety, and
its compliance with other statutory guidelines. '  A party who is
adversely affected by the Board's decision can appeal the order and
decision to the Court of Appeals of Franklin County, Ohio.2' The order
of the Board will be affirmed if the Board's order is "supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with the
law. ""
While obtaining the required approval to site a facility is a
necessary first step in beginning operations, it is just that - a first step.
As the events in East Liverpool demonstrate, the fight to prevent an
unwanted facility from being sited will often continue well past the
permitting stage of development. These protracted fights often result in
huge financial losses capable of dooming a facility to failure. It is the-
recognition of this reality that inspired states like Massachusetts and
Wisconsin to incorporate ADR into their siting statutes. If potential
controversies can be addressed up front through a process of negotiation,
future controversies can hopefully be limited. In order to begin evaluating
the potential value of such a siting scheme in Ohio, it is helpful to outline
the workings of both the Massachusetts and Wisconsin statutes.
II. THE MASSACHUSEtTS STATUTE
The Massachusetts process begins with the submission of a notice
of intent by the developer to the Hazardous Waste Facilities Site Safety
Council ' (Council), as well as to designated governmental department
directors, the chief executive officer of the host and abutting communities,
24. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05(D)(4)(a)-(d) (Baldwin 1992). A person claiming
to be "aggrieved or adversely affected by the proposal" must file a petition to intervene no
later than 30 days after the date of publication of public hearings. The petition will be
granted by the Board if good cause is shown. See id. § 3734.05(D)(4)(d).
25. Id. § 3734.05(D)(6). While Ohio's statutory scheme allows for local involvement
and citizen participation through the adjudication hearing, the ultimate approval or
disapproval of the application is made by the Board. In this respect, Ohio's process
resembles a more traditional adversarial approach to resolving disputed issues.
26. Id. § 3734.05(D)(7).
27. Id.
28. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 7 (Law. Co-op. 1992). The Council is a twenty-one
member body made up of state and local government officials, a professional chemical
engineer, a professional hydrogeologist, six private citizens, and representatives from
municipal, health, and industrial associations. See id. § 4(13).
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appropriate regional planning agencies, and persons owning real property
on the site." The Council is required, within fifteen days of the notice
of intent, to review the proposed project to determine if the proposal is
"feasible and deserving of state assistance." 3  Upon notification by the
Department of Environmental Management that a community is on the
final list of suggested sites established by the Council, the chief executive
officer of the targeted community is to create a local assessment committee
(Committee).31  The Committee is composed of various community
leaders and four residents that stand to be most immediately affected by
the proposed facility.' It is the Committee's duty to represent the best
interests of the host community in all negotiations and "to negotiate the
detailed terms, provisions, and conditions of a siting agreement to protect
the public health, safety, and the environment of the host community. '
In order to help ensure that the Committee is able to adequately fulfill
these obligations, the statute provides for the availability of technical
assistance grants to the Committee and abutting communities.' These
funds are to be expended for the purpose of allowing the Committee to
gain the requisite expertise and resources necessary to effectively negotiate
with the developer who, in all likelihood, is more knowledgeable in the
technical aspects of the proposed facility. 5
Ultimately, the site cannot be constructed unless a siting
agreement is arrived at between the developer and the Committee of the
host community. 3' The siting agreement specifies the terms and
conditions upon which the facility can be constructed and operated.3"
Among the more important terms that must be contained in the siting
agreement are the following: (1) "compensation, services and special
29. Id. § 7. The notice of intent is required to include certain information including: a
description of the types of hazardous wastes that the facility would handle; a description of
the technology and procedures to be employed; and the potential location, if known, of the
facility. Id. § 7(l)-(3).
30. Id.
31. Id.§5.
32. Id.
33. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 5(l)-(2) (Law. Co-Op. 1992).
34. Id. § 11.
35. These technical assistance grants are limited initially to $15,000, but communities
may petition for additional grants if the need arises. Id. § 4(5).
36. Id. § 12.
37. Id.
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING
benefits that will be provided to the host community by the developer,"38
(2) "operating procedures and practices, the design of the facility and its
associated activities," 3  (3) "monitoring procedures, practices and
standards necessary to assure and continue to demonstrate that the facility
will be operated safely,"' and (4) "provisions for resolving any
disagreements in the construction and interpretation of the siting agreement
that may arise between the parties."4" Throughout the negotiations, the
Council is to facilitate the negotiation process by making reports, opinions,
and public records available to the parties. 2
In the event that the negotiations result in an impasse, the Council
may frame the appropriate issues in dispute for submission to final and
binding arbitration.4 Ultimately, the final agreement, whether arrived at
with or without the aid of arbitration, results in a binding, nonassignable
contract enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction.' With this
statutory scheme as a backdrop, it is useful to compare the siting approach
employed by the state of Wisconsin.
IV. THE WISCONSIN STATUTE
Like the Massachusetts statute, the Wisconsin statute seeks to
"create and maintain an effective and comprehensive policy of negotiation
and arbitration between the applicant for a license and a committee
representing the affected municipalities.' Through this system of
negotiation and, if necessary, arbitration, the statute seeks to prevent
38. MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 21D, § 12(5) (Law. Co-Op. 1992). The statute also allows
abutting communities to petition the Council for compensation to be paid to it by the
developer. This petition requires the chief executive officer of the abutting community to
agree to accept the compensation as determined by the Council or by a three person
arbitration panel. See id. § 14.
39. Id. § 12(2).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 12(9).
42. Id. § 13.
43. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 15 (Law. Co-Op. 1992). The arbitration panel can
take one of two forms. One option is to have a three member panel comprised of one
member selected by the developer, one member selected by the Committee, and one
"impartial arbitrator" who is selected by both the developer and the Committee.
Alternatively, the developer and the Committee can agree to select a single "impartial
arbitrator" that is acceptable to both parties. Id. § 15.
44. Id. § 12.
45. WIs. STAT. § 144.4452) (1989-1990).
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debilitating local opposition by providing a mechanism that will assure that
local concerns and needs will be addressed."
The Wisconsin approach is very similar to the Massachusetts
statute in its scheme to include local participation in the siting process.
This local participation begins when a municipality receives a written
request for specifications of local approval from the applicant. 47 At this
point, the affected municipalities must prepare themselves for the
negotiation process by appointing members to the local committee
(Committee) and by adopting siting resolutions." "The siting resolution
[must] state the affected municipalities' intent to negotiate and, if
necessary, arbitrate with the applicant concerning the proposed facility.'
The Committee, as the representative of the affected municipalities, is
composed of officials and citizens who can adequately address the needs
and concerns of the constituency.'0
A. Negotiation Between Conunittee and Applicant
Under the Wisconsin statute, the applicant and the Committee are
free to negotiate with respect to all subjects except those subjects that
pertain to the need for the facility and those subjects that deal with
proposals to make the applicant's responsibilities under the approved
feasibility report or plan of operation less stringent."1 While the parties
are afforded wide latitude in choosing subjects to negotiate, there are only
certain subjects that are appropriate for arbitration under the statute.
These subjects include: (1) "[c]ompensation to any person for substantial
economic impacts which are a direct result of the facility including
insurance and damages not covered by the waste management fund,"'
(2) "[o]perational concerns including, but not limited to, noise, dust,
debris, odors, and hours of operation but excluding design capacity,"'
(3) "[u]ses of the site . . . after closing the facility,' (4)
46. See id. § 144.445(2)(a)-(b).
47. Id. § 144.44(lm)(b).
48. Id. § 144.445(7)(a).
49. Id. § 144.445(6)(a).
50. The Committee is made up of four members of the town, city or village in which
the facility is proposed to be located, two members of the resident county and one person
from each affected municipality. WIS. STAT. §§ 144.445(7)(a)(1), (a)(lm)-(a)(2) (1989-
1990).
51. Id. § 144.445(8)(b)(1).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 144.445(8)(b)(3).
54. Id. § 144.445(8)(b)(5).
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"[e]conomically feasible methods to recycle or reduce the quantities of
waste to the facility, " s and (5) "[the applicability or nonapplicability of
any preexisting local approvals.""
As the negotiations proceed, either party can petition the Waste
Facility Siting Board (Board) to determine if a proposal is excluded from
negotiation.' Negotiating sessions may be conducted with the assistance
of a mediator if mediation is approved by both the applicant and the
Committee.' If the applicant and the Committee cannot agree on the
selection of a mediator, the applicant and the Committee may request the
Board to appoint a mediator.'
If an agreement is not reached on any item, either party
independently or both parties jointly may submit a written petition to the
Board to initiate arbitration. The Board conducts arbitrations and issues
arbitration awards that are binding on the parties." If the Board fails to
issue an arbitration award within ninety days, the governor shall issue the
award."
B. Technical Determinations
It is key to note that while the negotiation outlined above
proceeds, a separate set of hearings and determinations are conducted
regarding the technical merits of the proposed facility. The applicant is
required to submit a feasibility report to the Department of Natural
Resources (Department) for evaluation and approval.' The feasibility
report addresses issues such as the site's characteristics, the facility's
design, and the potential adverse health effects to surrounding residents."
After the feasibility report and environmental impact statement, if
necessary, are submitted, the public is given a chance to gain information,
submit comments, and even challenge the factual content of the report.'5
55. WiS. STAT. § 144.445(8)(b)(6) (1989-1990).
56. Id. § 144.445(8)(b)C7).
57. Id. § 144.445(9)(b).
58. Id. § 144.445(9)(c).
59. id.
60. Wis. STAT. § 144.445(10)(a)-(b) (1989-1990).
61. Id. § 144.44 5(19)(p)-(q).
62. Id. § 144.445(10)(p).
63. Id. § 144.44(2)(a).
64. Id. § 144.44(2)()-(m).
65. WiS. STAT. § 144.44(2g)(c) & (2r) (1989-1990).
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Ultimately, the Department will either approve or disapprove the proposed
facility based on the technical merits.6'
V. EXPERIENCES UNDER THE WISCONSIN AND MASSACHUSETTS
STATUTES
On paper, both the Wisconsin and Massachusetts statutes seem to
provide a thoughtful, logical process through which those involved can
work out their differences and ultimately come to an agreement. In
practice however, the statutes, particularly the Massachusetts statute, have
not performed up to expectations.' To date, there have been no
successful sitings under the Massachusetts statute.68 In fact, there have
been no serious negotiations between parties. 6' The statute has been so
ineffective that Massachusetts has ceased its attempts to site hazardous
waste facilities under the statute.70  The experience in Wisconsin has
been a bit more positive. Under its statute, there have been sixteen
negotiations that ultimately resulted in several successful sitings.'
However, these cases involved sitings under the statute's provisions for
solid waste facilities.' It has been used successfully only to expand a
few hazardous waste facilities, rather than to site any new ones.' With
this reality as a starting point, it is necessary to compare these two statutes
in order to explain their successes and failures.
The lesson to be learned from the relative success of the
Wisconsin experience, as compared with the Massachusetts experience,
appears to be the necessity of separating political and technical questions
surrounding the proposed site. 4 As outlined above, the Massachusetts
approach involves a technological feasibility decision by the Council within
fifteen days of the submission of a notice of intent. As Professor Jonathan
Brock argues, the Council, whose twenty-one members are essentially
66. Note that it is this bifurcated process, whereby the technical determinations are
made separately from those pertaining to the socio-economic impact of the facility, that has
been cited as a key reason for the relative success of the Wisconsin statute. See Jonathan
Brock, Mandated Mediation: A Contradiction in Tenns, 2 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 57, 74 (1991).
67. See id. at 71.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Brock, supra note 66, at 71.
72. Id. at 74.
73. Id. at 60, n.5.
74. Id. at 74.
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political and representational, does not have the "technical capacity nor the
protection from community pressure to resist local opposition" 5 in
making such a determination. In this context, it is not surprising that
negotiations in Massachusetts have never progressed seriously.'
As outlined above, the Wisconsin approach is designed to avoid
this problem by excluding technical issues from the agenda of the siting
board. Instead, the Department of Natural Resources performs studies and
holds hearings to determine the technical merits and safety of the proposed
facility."7 Simultaneously, the host community and the developer are left
to discuss the social and economic questions that will become issues if and
when the facility is granted approval on a technological basis." Thus, by
separating the political and technical issues, the Wisconsin proceedings are
less subject to political maneuvering and pressure and, theoretically should
be accorded greater respect from all parties involved. Despite this
possible improvement, however, there are numerous problems that will
continue to plague attempts to employ ADR in siting hazardous waste
facilities. These limitations must be recognized when considering whether
ADR could be a useful tool in Ohio's statutory scheme.
VI. ADR iN HAZARDOUS WASTE SUTING:
AN INCOMPLErE ANSWER TO A DIFFICULT PROBLEM
A. A Failure in Underlying Assumptions
Despite the qualified success of the Wisconsin approach, several
fundamental problems persist when employing ADR in hazardous waste
siting disputes. First, as Professor Jonathan Brock argues, it has been
very difficult to institutionalize mechanisms for negotiated settlements
between conflicting interests." Professor Brock contends that
institutionalized mechanisms for resolving these disputes lack the necessary
flexibility that is needed to match the circumstances of the dispute to the
parties." It is an attempt to lay the groundwork for successful
75. Id.
76. Brock, supra note 66, at 71.
77. Id. at 74.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 59.
80. Symposium, Alternative Methods of Resolving Environmental Disputes, 2 VILL.
ENvTL. LJ. 1, 6 (1991).
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negotiation before knowing the specific dynamics of the particular
dispute.'m On the other hand, when parties come to the table voluntarily,
ultimate resolution is more likely because the parties are able to establish
the appropriate process and ground rules to fit the specific conflict at
hand.82
Indeed, one dynamic that is overlooked in the incorporation of
ADR in siting disputes is the fact that there might be a range of views
concerning the desirability of a proposed facility. This certainly is the
case in East Liverpool, Ohio where a significant number of vocal
supporters of the incinerator believe it to be a safe and vital element for
the future economic health of the community 3 This situation presents a
conflict for those community representatives, many of whom hold political
office, who must attempt to bargain from a position based on the best
interest of the community as a whole while, at the same time, keeping an
eye toward the protection of their political careers.
Second, both statutes further assume that a community will
ultimately agree to the developer's proposal if the requisite "deal" is sweet
enough. Under the Massachusetts statute, as envisioned by Professor
Lawrence Bacow, the potential compensation paid by the developer to the
host community would, in theory, be so enticing that the end result would
be a competition among several targeted communities to obtain the
facility." However, there are many communities in which opposition
runs so high that compensation can never approach that needed to satisfy
the community.m  This appears to be the case in Massachusetts. As
Professor Bacow contends, "no single developer of one of these facilities
[in Massachusetts] could afford to compensate a community."U
Professor Bacow notes that one lesson to be learned is that for
negotiated compensation to work, the financial resources are going to have
to come from additional sources.' Clearly, a business that expects to
operate at a profit cannot withstand the financial burden of public
opposition forever. For many companies, the financial sacrifice will be
unbearable and as a consequence, a potentially beneficial facility will never
be realized. Indeed, this is the heart of the siting dilemma. Because it is
81. Id. at 7.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Paul Glastris, Environmental Fights in the Family, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP.,
Jan. 11, 1993, at 27.
84. See Symposium, supra note 80, at 33.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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ultimately in the state's best interest to ensure that safe and efficient
disposal facilities are sited, one possible solution is to provide state
financial assistance to those proposals that meet the technological and
safety requirements.
B. Resistance Away From the Bargaining Table
Probably the most significant shortcoming of any attempt to
employ ADR in this context is that it does not preclude the traditional
combative approaches that communities can take in an attempt to frustrate
a developer. This is a significant point in that it strikes at the very heart
of the assumptions upon which the scheme for ADR in siting was built.
Specifically, it is assumed that negotiating parties will be able to work out
their differences at the bargaining table and thus avoid a need for
confrontational tactics. By taking control of the negotiation, rather than
allowing a detached governmental body to make critical decisions on its
behalf, the affected community controls its own destiny. However, when
this assumption fails, the benefits of a system of negotiation begin to
evaporate.
Philip Cronin has outlined several legal maneuvers that are still
available to communities in Massachusetts seeking to prevent a siting in
their community. First, under the Massachusetts law, the developer has
the power to locate a hazardous waste facility on land zoned for industrial
use.' However, a community can legally eliminate all industrial zoning
prior to receiving a notice of intent from a developer."' Second, there
are numerous approvals and permits that the developer must receive
through state departments and local boards in order to begin construction
and operation." Many of these determinations are subject to judicial
review in court. Thus, aggressive opponents have the incentive and,
indeed, the ability to bring litigation to challenge the findings of these
bodies.' Finally, the arbitration provisions do not define criteria that the
88. See Cronin, supra note 17, at 40.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 40-41.
91. Id. Not surprisingly, opponents of the East Liverpool incinerator looked for ways
to challenge the validity of WTI's operating permit in an attempt to frustrate the facility's
operation. One example involved whether WTI's operating permit reflected the true owners
of the plant. According to a 296 page report by the Ohio Attorney General, the four original
companies that made up the WrI partnership and that obtained the operating permit had
substantially changed. Some of the original companies have been replaced and all of the
partners are now owned by Von Roll America. Because Ohio law requires all hazardous
waste facility owners to undergo a background investigation, many incinerator opponents had
hoped this subsequent investigation would lead to findings that would result in the permit's
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arbitrator is to employ in resolving impasses.' Because the arbitration
order is subject to judicial review, any unfavorable order can be
challenged on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his or her power."
Clearly, these tactics will often be motivated less by a desire to
protect the health and welfare of the community than by a desire to simply
prevent an unwanted facility from being built. With this in mind, it is
necessary to consider whether these factors outweigh the potential
usefulness of ADR in Ohio.
VII. WOULD ADR BE EFFECTrVE iN OHio?
A. The Wrong Answer for East Liverpool
This brings us back to the situation in East Liverpool, Ohio.
What is to be learned there? In one sense, developers of the incinerator
might feel justified in downplaying the usefulness of ADR techniques.
Despite all of the controversy and hostility surrounding the project, the
facility was sited and has begun operating. What explains this "success*?
One could argue that the answer, ironically, lies partly in the fact that the
Ohio statute prevents local citizens from taking as instrumental a role in
the siting process as would be the case in Massachusetts or Wisconsin.
The ultimate decision to grant primary approval is contingent upon the
approval of a siting board, which is fairly isolated from the pressures and
localized prejudices against the incoming developer. The developer is not
required to jump through the additional hoop of negotiating with local
leaders concerning social and economic considerations.
With respect to the East Liverpool incinerator, this argument has
some merit. A number of factors have contributed to make this particular
controversy a bad candidate for an effective negotiation. First, despite the
assurances from government officials, many are not convinced of the
incinerator's safety." These fears would likely prove to be a major
revocation. See W7 Idles Incinerator, Faces Ownership Question From Ohio Attorney
General, HAZARDOUS WASTE Bus. July 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
92. Cronin, supra note 17, at 41.
93. Id.
94. This fear has been exacerbated by the fact that the incinerator is located close to a
school and to residential housing. These concerns are not without merit. Results from the
incintrator's test bum in March of 1993 revealed that it released four times the acceptable
amount of mercury. See T.C. Brown, WT7's Diaxin Emissions Found Excessive By EPA,
THE PLAIN DEALER, June 24, 1993, at 5B.
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obstacle in conducting any fruitful negotiation. Second, the facility is
geographically situated such that the potential harmful effects of the
facility are a matter of concern for neighboring communities in several
states. While these "affected communities" will be the recipients of the
harmful health effects of the incinerator, they will not receive any of the
economic benefits that the incinerator will bring to East Liverpool.5
With only negatives to be gained by the siting of the incinerator, these
communities would be motivated to approach a negotiation with but one
goal - to ensure that the incinerator never begins operation. The concern
about the potential widespread health effects has attracted the attention of
environmental groups and activists who have the resources to bring public
pressure and litigation to frustrate the operation of the incinerator. These
factors combine to make a process of negotiation in the siting of the East
Liverpool incinerator a formula for failure. This, however, does not mean
that a system of negotiation and arbitration has no place in Ohio's statutory
scheme.
B. Another Time, Another Place
Despite its probable lack of effectiveness in East Liverpool, ADR
should not be summarily dismissed as a worthless option for Ohio's siting
scheme. The qualified success of the Wisconsin approach indicates
otherwise. However, for this system to be successful in Ohio, certain
pitfalls should be avoided.
First, a comparison of Wisconsin's experience and the experience
in East Liverpool does demonstrate one obvious point: The more
controversial a proposed facility is, the greater the likelihood for eventual
failure. While there will surely be a few residents within a community
that will rally against a proposed facility, regardless of how benign, a
facility has a much better chance of success if a developer can alleviate the
concerns of local residents. In this respect, developers should endeavor to
propose constructing facilities that employ demonstrated, workable
technology.
95. Both Senator Rockefeller of West Virginia and Representative Alan Mollohan of
West Virginia took steps to impede the incinerator's operation by calling for a federal
investigation into the validity of WTI's permit. Their concerns stemmed from the failure of
the original permit to include the Columbiana County Port Authority as an owner of the site.
See Rockefeller Challenges Incinerator Process, UPI, Feb. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Current File. A month later, Representative Joseph Kolter of Pennsylvania
called for a complete halt to the incinerator's construction until an investigation into the
legality of WTI's permit could be resolved. See Lawmaker Wants Incinerator Constuction
Halted, UPI, Mar. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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Second, the local community must feel confident in the facility
siting board's technological feasibility and health and safety
determinations. Further, the local community must trust that the developer
will be held to exacting compliance standards by state and federal
regulators. If this confidence is eroded, the chances of a successful
negotiation will be put in jeopardy.
Much of the above holds true whether ADR is used or the siting
takes place under a traditional statute. However, by incorporating a
system of negotiation and arbitration into Ohio's siting statute, parties may
feel less compelled to resort to combative tactics, resulting in a savings of
time and resources. If this holds true, it would prove helpful as Ohio
moves into the next century.
William T. Fischbein
